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1  Introduction 
The vast majority of goods are nowadays aváilable in a variety of types with 
substantially different impact on the environment.  Environmental friendly 
products co-exist in the market with more environmentally damaging ver­
sions. Examples of green products include bio-degradable cleaning products, 
mercury-free batteries, recycled paper, unleaded fuel,  low  fuel-consumption 
vehicles, biologically grown vegetables, products in recyclable containers or 
recyclable products themselves. In  general, green products are sold at higher 
prices than their competing variants, even when the rest of the product's 
features are exactly the same.  The reason for this successful product coex­
istence is obviously that consumera, some more than others, are willing to 
spend more money on green products.  Just why consumera behave in this 
way is a controversial question.  It might be argued that consumers believe 
they can significantly contribute to the reduction of environmental pollution. 
Although it is collective action what does really change the state of the envi­
ronment, buying green products is perse a gratifying action and it can exert 
some power to infiuence fum's attitudes towards the environment.1  What­
ever the reason, consumera' behavior has a potential for positive effects on 
the environment.2  Even though green is still a minor feature of markets we 
can expect more markets developing green varieties or, what really concems 
us here, firm's competing at an increasing rate in the environmental features 
and services associated to the products they offer. 
These arguments suggest that vertical product differentiation models pro­
vide the appropriate framework to analyze the provision of environmental 
services in markets and the impact of alternative regulatory policies on this 
provision and on the resultant aggregate pollution.3  Recent papers on qual­
1According to the polítical scienee literature, individual aetion is one of the five dimen­
sions of environmental eonsciousness and it eneompases all prívate environmental behavior 
ineluding eonsumption of environmental friendly produets, ecolabeled produets and waste 
disposal efforts.  The term environmental eonciousness eomprises elements within five dif­
ferent dimensions:  affeetive, eognitive, connative, individual action and collective aetion. 
2Infiuencing eonsumption through information and education can be a source of en­
vÍronmental improvement.  Indeed,  policiy  agendas'  of industrialized countries inelude 
financia! and regulatory support to green production (i.e.  ecobalanees and eeoauditing) 
as well as social or edueational programs. 
:JThe effects of environmental poliey in homogeneous oligopolistic markets have been 
widely  analyzed in the industrial organization literarure:  Buchanan (1969)  and Oates 
and Strassman (1984)  in monopoly, Ebert (1991)  in a Cournot duopoly and Katsoulakos 
and Xepapadeas (1992)  and Requate (1992)  in oligopoly.  They all foeus on the design 
of optimal, Pigouvian, emÍssion fees.  In general,  an optimal emÍssion tax within non­
eompetitive market struetures falls short of marginal external damages and has mínimum 
output distortions.  Moreover, overinternalization of environmental damages in oligopoly 
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policies  can undoubtedly be welfare improving.  For  instance imposing a 
mínimum quality standard improves social welfare as, in the regulated equi­
librium, higher quality products are provided and more consumers are active 
(Rennen (1991)). When environmental extemalities are considered, however, 
the second fact might be counter-productive as aggregate pollution depends 
on both total sales and unitary emissions of the products. Our claim is that 
environmental policy in differentiated industries has to take into account the 
effects not only derived from quality readjustments but also from consumers 
reallocations. 
To substantiate our claim, we study the effects of technology subsidiza­
tion, maximum emission standards and ad valorem taxes on the equilibrium 
aggregate pollution in an environmentally differentiated market. We consider 
two firms that first choose the environmental quality of their products and 
then their prices.  Consumers differ in their valuation of the environmental 
features of the products. As a result, the (unregulated) equilibrium is char­
acterized by the coexistence of two varieties ofthe product identified by their 
unitary emissions levels. 
To the best of our knowledge, three articles have studied the effects of en­
vironmental targeting policies in a differentiated market, namely, Motta and 
Thisse (1993), Cremer and Thisse (1994) and Constantatos and Sartzetakis 
(1996).  As in ours, all these papers take advantage of the analogy between 
quality and environmental features of a producto  Cremer and Thisse (1994) 
study the provision of environmental quality and the effects of ad-valorem 
taxation on this provision in a setting in which consumers enjoya positive 
extemality associated with the average environmental quality. Constantatos 
and Sartzetakis (1996)  evaluates the effects of a commodity tax when the 
production of a high quality product is associated with a negative environ­
mental extemality (te.  the use of a highly polluting input that cannot be 
substituted at all). They also measure the environmental extemality through 
the average quality.  Using the average environmental quality might som&­
times be justified by lacks of information but, in general, it can be misleading 
because it is a rough approximation. Thus, we have departed from this litera­
ture by assuming that product differentiation is related to an observable and 
measurable variable which captures the unitary emissions level of a specific 
product variety.  Sorne examples are mercury quantity in batteries, photo­
copiers' ozone harmful unit emissions, central heating' CO2  emissions, etc. 
market structures tends to reduce the number of firms, firm's output and, therefore, total 
pollution levels.  This argument has contributed to reduce concern on tax, speeifically, 
and on other environmental policy instruments, in general,  in the case of oligopolistic 
industries. 
3 Our modeling allows us to accurately compute the negative environmental 
externality and, following our claim, study the impact of regulatory policies 
on both the emission level per unit of product (associated product quality) 
and the firms' aggregate pollution level after consumption (industrial environ­
mental externality). Motta and Thisse (1993) study the impact of minimum 
environmental standards on market structure and welfare.  However, they do 
not investigate the effects of this policy on aggregate pollution. 
There is another imporlant difference between our paper and those of 
Cremer and Thisse (1994)  and Constantatos and Sartzetakis (1996).  While 
they study the impact of ad-valorem taxation allowing entry in the industry 
but limiting to the study of situations in which the market is covered (all 
consumers are active in equilibrium), we contrastively restrict the analysis 
to the duopolistic case but allow for the possibility of non-covered markets 
situations, as in Motta and Thisse (1993).  We consider our setting as more 
accurate for the study of those situations in which small taxes (or different 
policies)  are introduced.,  keeping the market structure unchanged but dis­
torling the allocation of consumers and abatement between firms.  However, 
Cremer and Thisse (1994) and Constantatos and Sartzetakis (1996) seems to 
be more adequate in situations in which larye taxes distorl market structure. 
Our resu1ts are as follows:  First, we characterize the (unregulated) equi­
librium.  Two product varieties arise in equilibrium: the clean and the dirty 
products. Surprisingly, the clean firm (which is that producing the less pol­
luting product) might actually be the more polluting firm when total pol­
lution after sales is considered.  The reason is that in equilibrium the clean 
firm's market share is higher than the dirly firm's.  This happens whenever 
absolute product differentiation is small, that is, whenever the environmental 
quality gap between both products is not very large.  Second, we show that 
environmental standards, whether defined as pollution rates or as technol­
ogy standards, may have adverse effects on industrial pollution levels. While 
both firms  improve their individual environmental quality,  the total level 
of pollution might be higher.  Third, we show that a direct subsidy on the 
abatement teclmology increases the level of environmental services of both 
firms and unambiguously decreases aggregate pollution:  the reason is that 
technology subsidization does not affect consumers allocation. Fourth, a uni­
form ad-valorem tax tends to decrease abatement of both firms in the market 
and.,  as a result, total emissions increase.  Finally, differential tax treatment 
through a non uniform ad-valorem tax can achieve the same positive results 
as a  uniform direct suh.idy to the firms.  Increasing the tax rate on the 
dirty firm or decreasing the tax rate on the cleaner one, resu1ts in aggregate 
pollution decreasing. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the model 
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and the (unregulated) equilibrium.  In Section 3 we explore the effects of a 
direet subsidy on the costs of the abatement technology.  Seetion 4 analyzes 
the effects of an environmental standard.  Section 5 is devoted to the case 
where the government introduces an ad-valorem tax, considering both uni­
form and non-uniform tax rates. Section 6 concludes. Sorne proofs have been 
relegated to an appendix. 
The model 
We consider a standard model of vertical product differentiation.4 
On the demand side of the market there is a  continuum of consumers 
indexed by B and uniformly distributed on [O, 1]. The utility funetion of a 
consumer with index B is  denoted by V(B, e),  where B is the individual's 
produet matching value and e  denotes the environmental features of the 
produet (the pollution level derived from consumption, use, produet  ion  , or 
disposal of the product).5  From now on we will refer to this environmental 
variable as the pollution level  associated with the produet or the unitary 
emÍ8sions level ofthe producto  We assume these emissions per unit ofproduct 
to be perfectly observable.  Further, it is assumed that, for all e,  Ví(·)  > O, 
which means that, given any product with pollution level e,  a  consumer j 
whose type is  Bj  derives higher utility than consumer i  whose type is  Bi 
whenever Bj > Bi.  Therefore, Bdescribes the environmental awareness of the 
consumer and the higher its value, the greater consumer's willingness to pay 
to reduce environmental pollution.  On the other hand, we assume that, for 
all B,  112(.)  < O which means that all consumers derive higher utility from 
consumption ofthe less polluting variety. That is, given a free choice between 
two produets all consumers agree. 
For expositional purposes, in what follows,  we adopt the following sim­
ple indirect utility funetion specification:  consumer B derives utility U  = 
B(e - e) - p if  she consumes the product whose pollution level is e and pays 
price p. Under this specmcation, the individual aclually evaluates pollution 
relative to a  generally accepted or known pollution level  (e).6  This refer­
4See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Mussa and Rosen (1978) for this framework. 
5Although many environmental eharacteristics can exist we  assume that all environ­
mental features can be represented by a single unidimensional variable.  An example is 
mereury quantity in batteries, water-use together with ehemical eontain assoeiated to a 
unit of eleaning produet or the rate of input use within a produetion proeess. 
6Note that e, the pollution index assoeiated with thf(! produet, is of common knowledge 
for  all  consumers.  It gives the maximum pollution level  or the festures of the more 
polluting verision of the produet in a  (homogeneous)  market.  Beeause we foeus on the 
development of green markets, it is plausible to assume that consumers exactly perceive 
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ence level is normalized to e = 1 without loss of generality. We assume that 
no consumption gives zero utility to consumers.7  In addition, we also  as­
sume that consumers only derive utility from the first unit they consume or, 
alternatively, that each consumer buys one unit of the product only. 
On the supply side of the market there are two identical firms producing 
the good. Each firm offers one product with a unique environmental feature 
determmed by the technology it chooses for the provision of the good.  The 
production technology set is connnon knowledge and is characterized by the 
cost function e(e).  Provision of the environmentally cleaner products is more 
costly, that is e' (e)  < O,  and, we assume that there are decreasing returns 
to scale, that is, d'(e) > O.  In what follows,  for computational purposes, we 
particularly adopt the following quadratié abatement cost function: 
e(e) =  k(l - e)2  (1) 
2 
Unit marginal production costs are assumed to be zero, without loss of gen­
erality. 
Firms play the following two-stage game: In  the first stage, firms simulta­
neously decide on the abatement technology they will use; that is, ei is chosen 
at a cost e(ei), for i  =  1,2.  In the second stage, firms simultaneously set 
prices and consumers choose which variety to buyo  This two-stage modelling 
is motivated by the fact that often firms can rapidly change their prices while 
a change in the abatement technology takes place in the long runo  In this 
contex:t, it is reasonable to assume that abatement technology decisions are 
long-run variables while prices are short-run variables. The solution concept 
used is subgame perfection. We proceed by backward induction, solving first 
the second stage to find the optimal pricing functions and then, solving the 
first stage to obtain both products' optimal emission leveIs. 
The firm which chooses a lower abatement technology will be called the 
dirty firm, while the firm which chooses the higher abatement technology will 
be referred as the clean firmo  Without loss of generality, we consider firm 1 
to be the dirty firm,  offering a product with associated pollution level el at 
price PI, and firm 2 to be the clean firm,  offering a product with pollution 
level e2 and price P2  where, reasonably, el > e2' 
Next we derive the demand functions for each producto In  the continuum 
of individuals, there is one consumer indifferent between buying either good 
the improvement of the environmental features assoeiated to a new "green" variety. 
7Indeed, we can consider that those consumers that do not buy a green variety do buy 
an homogeneous version of the product in a perfectly competitive market, which price is 
normalized to zero. An example of this argument can be the Spanish paper market, where 
two big firms compete in the recycled paper market while there is a large number of firms 
in the regular paper market. 
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with preferences determined by the parameter eh  =  (P2  PI)/(el  e2)' 
Similar  ly,  there is  one consumer indifferent  betvveen purchasing the good 
produced by the dirty fum and not buying at all who is characterized by the 
parameter el = p¡f(l-el)' Demand for the dirty fum comes from the group 
of consumers in the lower bound el < e < eh while demand for the clean firm 
comes from the upper bound group eh  < e < 1.  Thus, quantity demanded 
ÍTom both firms is given respectively by: 
~=~-~  ~  ~ 
el - e2  1-el 
P2  - PI  (3) q2  =  1 ­
el - e2 
In the second stage of the game,  fums simultaneously choose prices to 
maximize their profits, IIi =  Piqi  - c(ei), for i  =  1,2.  From the fust order 
conditions we obtain the following Nash equilibrium prices charged by the 
dirty and clean fum: 
(4) 
(5) 
where, as expected, p;(e¡,e2) > pi(e¡,e2) : the more polluting good is sup­
plied at a lower price. 
To solve the first stage of the game, we write profits in terms of their fust 
stage decisions as: 
(6) 
(7) 
Firms choose their abatement technology (el' e2)  to maximize profits. First 
order conditions are: 
d'lrl = (1  )2 (7el - 3 - 4e2)  k(l  )  O e2  3  +  -el  =  (8)
del  (4e2- 3 - el) 
d_'lr_2 = 4 (1 _ e2)  ...:-(6  e_1+_2_ei=--_5_e2'---_3-::~2e.....  e2) = __  ..... I-+-4_e""'-i)  + k(l - O  (9)
de2  (4e2 - 3 - el) 
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We now define the following product differentiation variable,8 A =  (1  ­
e2)j(l - el), with A E  R+.  Since el >  e2  >  O,  then A  ~ 1.  Rearranging 
equations (8)  and (9) and solving for A we derive the unique real solution as 
X*  =  5.25123. By substitution, the following expressions for optimal emission 
levels and prices eh e2' PI  and P2,  are obtained in equilibrium:9 
0.253311 "'l  -_ 1 _  0.048238,  '"  e k  e2 =  1  (10)
k 
'"  0.010251  '"  0.10766 
PI =  k  ,P2 =  k  (11) 
which gives the following allocation of consumers or market shares:10 
qj"  =  0.2625,  q; =  0.52499 and q;  =  0.21251  (12) 
where q;  denotes the unserved market portion. 
Besides unitary pollution levels, we can measure the totallevel of pollu­
tion associated to each product variety.  Thus, we observe that, in equilib­
rium, the dirty firm sells 0.2625 units whose unitary emission level is given 
by el' The total emission level derived from the dirty product's consumption 
is El =  elql =  0.262497 - 0.012662jk.  On the other hand, the clean fum 
enjoys a higher market portion, selling 0.52499 units ofthe pollutant product 
characlerized by the unitary emission level e2. The clean firm's total emission 
level is Ez  =  ezCZ2  =  0.52499  0.132985jk. Total pollution in the market is 
Jh. =  El + Ez =  0.78749 - 0.14565jk. 
In equilibrium, the firms differentiate their produds and the market is 
partially divided between them. Those consumers with higher environmental 
consciousness buy the cleaner variety of the product while those consumers 
with lower environmental consciousness either purchase the dirty variety or 
8This variable is introduced as it facilitates computations (see Motta (1993)).  At the 
same time, it measures the relative degree of product differentiation which is a very useful 
tool in terms of the interpretation of the model  (see  Ronnen (1991)).  Note,  that the 
higher is A,  the higher is relative product differentiation.  In the appendix we report a11 
the relevant variables in terms of the product differentiation variable. 
9To prove that this is indeed an equilibrium we have to show that none oí the firms 
can improve its profits by leapfrogging the rivals' choice.  That is, firm 1 cannot increase 
its profits by choosing a  lower emission level than e2  and, analogously that firm 2 does 
not want to choose e:! > ei. It can be easily shown that there are not such incentives (see 
appendix). 
lONote that if we  assume nonnegative pollution levels,  el  ~  O and ~  ~  O,  there is a 
lower bound on abatement technology costs:  k  ~  ~ =0.25331. 
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do not buy at all.  Firms do not deviate from the equilibrium, by approxi­
mating their product variety to its rivaPs in order to attract some consumers, 
because it would force a price war strong enough to reduce their profitsll• 
<insert figures 1 and 2 about here> 
At this point, we further charactenze the results with respect to the 
pollution levels generated by each firmo  Consider Figure 1, which depicts per 
unit emissions, and Figure 2, which shows aggregate emissions. Observe first 
that emissions per unit ofproduct (eí' i =  1,2) are an increasing and concave 
function of the cost parameter k, which measures the level of abatement costo 
Obviously, as k  increases relatively more dirty products will be provided in 
equilibrium.  However, even though both firms' emissions per unit converge 
to e (firms' abatement efforts converge to zero) when the abatement cost goes 
to infinity, the clean firm's unit emissions increase faster than the dirty firm's 
unit emissions.  In other words, even though relative product differentiation 
(measured by,X) does not vary with respect to the parameter k, the absolute 
emissions differential between the firms is reduced with k. 
Second, the clean firm's total emissions exceed the dirty firm's total emis­
sions whenever the parameter k  is high enough.  Recall that total emissions 
per firm are simply Ei = eiqi, i = 1,2, which are also increasing and concave 
functions of the cost parameter. Note that both market shares and unitary 
emissions levels are endogenously determined in equilibrium.  While firms' 
market shares are constant with respect to k, firms'  emissions differential 
decreases as the c~t  parameter k increases. Therefore, there exists a k such 
that, for  all k  >  k,  aggregate pollution associated with the clean firm is 
higher than the dirty firm aggregate pollution.12 
The following proposition summarizes these findings: 
Proposition 1  (i) Each firm 's  emissions per unit of product increase with 
respect to the abatement cast pammeter k. 
(ii) Each firm 's total emission level increases with respect to the abatement 
cast pammeter k.  (As a result,  the industry total emission level  increases 
too). 
(iii) Even though the clean firm 's emissions per unit of  product are lower 
than the dirty firm's (e;  > e;),  total pollution genemted by the clean firm is 
llSee Shaked and Sutton (1982). 
12The fact that equilibrium market shares do not change with k is specific to the modelo 
However,  what drives  this result  is  not that feature,  but that the environmental gap 
between both firms  narrows as k  inereases.  This is due to the existence of decreasings 
returns to se ale. 
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higher than the total by  the  dirty firm (Ei < E2)  whenever the abatement 
costs are high enough,  that is,  as long as k> 0.4583855. 
In the lollowmg sections we analyze the effects 01 different command-and­
control policies and market based instruments widely used to affect the equi­
libriwn market allocation with the aim of reducing total industrial pollution. 
We start by analyzing the effects on pollution levels when the government in­
troduces a direct subsidy on technology. In section 4, the effects of imposing 
maximwn emissions standards are analyzed.  Finally, the implementation of 
ad-valorem taxes and their effects are studied. 
Technology subsidization 
Suppose that the government would like to induce the acquisition of cleaner 
production technologies.  Such an environmental target can be reached by 
offering a subsidy on the overall cost of technology.  Indeed, there exist nu­
merous institutional subsidy programs to induce environmental investment, 
even though intemational agreements - such as the 'polluter pays princi­
pIe' of the OECn - are explicitly aimed to avoid industrial subsidization.13 
Suppose then that the government offers the following subsidy to the firms: 
S(e)  =  0.5s(1 - e)2,  O < s < k.  AB  a  result, both firms face the new cost 
function: 
C(e) =  (k  s) (1  ~e)2  (13) 
Recomputing the new equilibriwn is straightforward and the following 
values are obtained: 
el = 1 - 0.048238,  e2 = 1 _  0.253311  (14)
k-s  k-s 
0.010251  0.10766 
PI =  ,P2= --- (15)
k-s  k-s 
ql  =  0.2625,  I?J =  0.52499 and qo = 0.21251  (16) 
Unitary emissions  levels  decrease for  all s. In fact,  a  technology sub­
sidy reduces abatement technology costs and,  as a  result,  optimal firms' 
abatement efforls and prices increase.  Aggregate emissions  levels  (El  = 
0.262497 - 0.0l2662j(k - s), lh =  0.52499 - 0.132985j(k - s)) decrease. 
UFor example, the PITMA program of the spanish Ministry of Industry and Trade have 
been offenng such technological aids since 1991. 
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The reason is that while the subsidy does not affect  firm's market shares 
because relative product differentiation does not change, unit emission levels 
decrease. 
The following proposition summarizes: 
Proposition 2  Suppose that the government subsidizes abatement technol­
ogy by the following function:  S(e) =  0.58(1 - e)2, O < 8 < k. Then (i)  both 
firms' unitary emissions  levels  decrease  and  (ii)  both  firms' total pollution 
levels into the market decrease. 
Next, we show how a standard on pollution may have a dramatic impact 
on the total level of pollution in environmentally differentiated markets. 
Standard on pollution 
It is generaIly agreed that a maximum emission or a  teclmology standard 
increases products' environmental quality. Suppose now that the government 
imposes a  maximum emission standard (in the forro  of emissions'  rate or 
a best or reconnnended available teclmology standard (BACT or RACT)) 
which, unavoidably has to be met by both firms.  We analyze the effects of 
this kind of policy on firm's optimal abatement levels, equilibrium consumers' 
allocation and total pollution levels. 
In the first place, we characterize how the unregulated equilibrium is af­
fected when a maximum emission standard per unit of product is introduced. 
To avoid duopolistic equilibrium non-existence problems, we consider a max­
imum emissions standard close enough to the dirty firm's optimal emissions 
in the unregulated equilibrium.14  In order to make the problem interest­
ing, the standard, of course, binds for the dirty firm.15  Previous analysis on 
product quality standards (see Ronnen (1991)  and Crampes and Hollander 
(1995))  suggest the following intuition on how an environmental standard 
affects the market equilibrium.  As a result of the emission standard policy, 
the dirty fum wiIl optima1ly meet the standard (as long as the costs of meet­
ing the standard are not prohibitive).  On the other hand, the clean firm 
optimal reaction oonsists of increasing its own abatement too, even though 
the standard is not binding for it, due to strategic behavior  ,16 
14A very restrictive maximum emission standard might result in a monopoly.  Below, we 
will come back on this point. 
15A  not binding standard for  the dirty firm  would not have  any effect at all  on the 
market. We would faTI  into the case previously analyzed. 
16Note that the clean firm reacts by increasing its own abatement in order to avoid a 
stronger price competition in the second stage of the game. 
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Obviously, since the dirty firm's choice set is restricted by the law there is 
a different market equilibrium. In this new regulated equilibrium abatement 
efforts  are unambiguously higher for  both firms.  Indeed,  Ronnen  (1991) 
and Motta and Thisse (1993)  condude that a standard policy would be a 
proper policy to reduce pollution levels of both firms.  Their analysis however 
overlooks the effects over total pollution levels in the market as a result of 
the standard policy.  Since the dirty firm's strategy space has been restricted, 
competition between firms tends to be stronger and market shares of both 
firms change. Thus, there is sorne potential for an increase in total pollution 
levels in the market. 
First of all, we emphasize that setting a very restrictive emission standard 
might result in negative profits for the dirty firm and, therefore, there will 
not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies. In this case, the market structure 
will  probably change to a  monopoly,  in which only the dean firm would 
survive.  Lower  levels  of pollution would result but market surplus would 
be lower.  Since this substantially complicates the analysis by introducing 
a higher number of cases, we rule out this possibility.  Thus, in this paper, 
we will only consider an emission standard policy that does not affect the 
market structure. Since an equilibrium necessarily exists when the emission 
standard is  "dose" enough to the unregulated equilibrium, we  restrict our 
analysis to its neighborhoods. 
The post-regulation equilibrium emission levels are then given by eí,e  = 
emax,  where emax is the imposed standard, and eí,e  =  BR2(emax), where the 
implicit function BR2(-) denotes the dean firm's best response (see equation 
9).  We denote the post-regulation total equilibrium emissions by  EJ.,e  = 
ifi,$er.e  for  the dirty firm  and E;.e  =  Q;.ee'2,$  for  the clean one.  Let  ETe 
denote the total pollution in the market, that is  E!/  =  EJ.,$ + E;,$.  For 
computational convenience, we denote total pollution levels in terms of the 
product differentiation variable, which is >"r.e = (1 - e;,$)/(l - emax). (Prom 
now on, we omit the superscript r.e. to denote the regulated equilibrium.) 
The equilibrium emission levels can be described by the following two 
equations: 




- k(4A _  1)3 
1 - e2 =  A(l - emax)  (18) 
Differentiating, it is easily seen that: 
dA  k(4A -1)" 
(19) -de-- =  4(16A2 -16A + 21)  > Ofor all A > 1 
max 
12 4(10), +1)(4), -1)2 > Ofor al1 ). > 1  (20)
(16).2 - 16), +21) 
These two properties are used to support our main results.  Equation 
(19) shows that product differentiation deereases as a result of the maximum 
standard policy.  Note also that this reduction is higher, the higher the cost 
parameter k.  Equation (20) shows that the clean fum's best response to the 
dirty firm adjustment consists of deereasing its emissions too. 
The following proposition states that total pollution can increase as a 
result of the maximum emissions standard policy.  The proof is given in the 
appendix. 
Proposition 3  After setting an emission standard,  close enough to the un­
regulated equilibrium,  that binds for the dirty firm: 
a)  pollution  derived from  ronsumption of the  dirty product increases if 
k> 1.040483 
b)  pollution derived from  ronsumption of the  clean  product increases if 
k > 56.441126 
e) total pollution in the market increases ifk > 37.9717. 
The intuition goes as follows:  Due to regulation, the dirty firm reduces 
its emissions to meet the standard. In order to reduce price competition, the 
clean firm's best response consists of reducing its emissions too.  However, 
because of emissions reductions are relatively more expensive for the clean 
firm,  its abatement effort is lower than the effort impelled to the dirty fum. 
As a result, product differentiation is reduced.  The deerease in the product 
differentiation fosters price competition and therefore, both prices deerease. 
Both effects, the decrease in prices and the deerease in emissions' levels induce 
higher sales for both firms,  as more consumers are active in the market. If 
the market effeet - which captures this increase in fum's market shares ­
is strong enough,  total pollution in the market will  increase, even though 
both firms reduce theÍr emissions per unit of producto  This market effect is 
stronger, the higher are abatement costs. 
The higher are firms'  abatement costs the stronger is the market effeet. 
The reason is that the pOBt-regulation product differentiation is lower the 
higher are abatement costs, as the clean firm has to incur even higher costs 
to differentiate its product to avoid price competition.  Thus, in the seeond 
stage of the game, firms  are involved in a price war sufficiently strong to 
deerease prices too mucho  Quantities sold by each fum increase enough to 
induce higher total pollution levels in the market. 
13 
5  Commodity taxation 
Taxation of polluting products has been widely used to reduce their con­
sumption and so, pollution derived frorn them.  Tobacco, fuels and cars are 
sorne examples of goods facing this type of taxation. We might also think of 
the current government agendas to tax electricity energy production, batter­
ies and product containers (i.e.  glass, plastic and paper) through recycling 
charges.  In this section we study the effects of commodity taxation policies 
on both the unitary and the total emissions levels. 
Consider an ad-valorern tax ti - a commodity tax where the per-unit tax 
is proportional to the price level- imposed on firm i, i =  1,2. Firm i's profit 
function is then given by: 
(21) 
To simplify the presentation of our results we define Ti =  1/(1 - tí) as the 
firrn i's ''tax burden".  Note that Ti  2:  1 defines a positive tax (O  < ti  :::; 
1)  while Ti  :::;  1 corresponds to a negative tax or direct subsidy  (ti:::; O). 
Besides, setting  TI = T2 = 1, we obtain the unregulated case analyzed above. 
Rewriting firm i's profits function in terms of Ti gives: 
'Tri = !PiCJi - C(ei),  i =  1,2  (22)
Ti 
5.1  Uniform value-added tax (subsidy) 
We assume in this section that both firms are charged at the same tax rate, 
that is TI =  T2 =  T.  There are many reasons to justify such a tax setting. 
In sorne cases, the government does not have enough information on firms' 
costs or polluting levels; in other cases, there are legal constraints impeding 
tax rates differentiation among firms participating in the same rnarket. 
We omit here the derivation of the equilibrium values, as it is solved using 
the same steps we undertook in the previous sections, substituting the profits 
functions for  (22).  An interesting implication derived frorn equation (22)  is 
that both, a) the firm i's optimal strategy facing the commodity tax ti and 
the cost function C(ei), and b) the firm i's optimal strategy facing the cost 
function TiC(ei)  and not being taxed at all,  are ex:actly the same.  When 
TI =  T2 =  T, this property allows us to assure the ex:istence of a duopolistic 
equilibrium as long as kT > 0,25331.  We limit the analysis to such cases. 
Thus, for  any T  2:  O (t <  1), the equilibrium: is unique and given by the 
following values: 
ei =  1 - 0.048238, e; =  1 _ 0.25331  (23)
kT  kT 
14 ~________~____,J__________________~________ 
*  0.010251  *  0.10766  (24) PI =  k7"  ,P2 =  k7" 
A  uniform tax rate does not affect  relative produet differentiation.  As  a 
result,  market shares of both fums remain unchanged,  that is,  as in the 
unregulated equilibrium (ql  =  0.262497  and ~ =  0.52499).  Firms' total 
emissions levels are then El = 0.262497 - 0.012662jk7" and F4 = 0.52499 ­
0.132985jk7", while total emissions level in the market is then Er = 0.78749­
0.14565jk7".  Firms' profits are '1l'j  = 0.0015274jk7"2,  '1l'; = 0.024437jk7"2  and 
consumers' surplus is 0.0732188jk7". 
Optimal unitary emissions are found to be inereasing for all 7" > O.  This 
is not surprising because an ad-valorem tax ean be seen as a way of inereas­
ing fums'  costs.  Moreover,  as market shares are not affected by the tax, 
introdueing taxation in our model unambiguously yields to higher pollution 
levels. 
The following proposition summarizes: 
Proposition 4  Consider the environmentally differentiated duopoly described 
above.  After imposing a uniform ad-valorem taz on both firms: 
a)  both firms' optimal unitary emission levels unambiguously increase. 
b)  both firms ' total emission levels unambiguously increase. 
5.2  Non-uniform value added tax 
In the previous seetion we  have investigated how symmetrie tax inereases 
reduee both firms optimal abatement levels which results in higher market 
pollution. Furthermore, social welfare is reduced. Instead of symmetrie tax­
ation poliey, the regulator might inerease only one firm's tax rate, say for 
instanee the dirtier firmo  In this section we foeus on the effects of such a pol­
iey. We investigate whether the regulator ean do better by taxing differently 
both polluting fums. 
We proeeed in the following way: starting from a situation in which both 
firms are taxed at the same tax rate t, we first slightly change the dirty firm 
tax rate and investigate the effects ofthis poliey on the equilibrium outcome. 
Secondly we slightly change the clean firm tax rateo Analogously, we empha.­
size that differentiated enough tax rates might raise duopolistie equilibrium 
non-existenee problems. However, these ean be avoided by assuming that the 
tax differentiation is amall enough.17  For that reason we limit the analysis to 
situations in which one of the fums' taxes is slightly raised or lowered, that 
is, assuming 7" l  ~ 7"2 
J,.u'-"~"''-',  it is  plausible to assume that it is  not feasible  to induce high levels of tax 
differentiation within a market. 
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Consider then the situation in which the clean firm  tax rate remains 
unchanged that is t2 =  t and the dirty firm tax rate is slightly changed, such 
that tI ~  t  and '7"1  ~ '7". It is easily seen (fol1owing the same steps as above) 
that there exists an equilibrium given by the unique solution to the following 
two equations system: 
el =  1 _  ,,\
2 
(4"\ ­ 7) 
k'7"¡ (4"\ _1)3 
(25) 
e2 =  1 _  4"\(4,,\2 ­ 3,,\ +32) 
k'7"2 (4"\ ­ 1) 
(26) 
Let us define the parameter "'(, with "'( =  '7"2/'7"1' which measures fums' tax 
differentiation.  The following lemma characlerizes how  the optimal prod­
uct differentiation variable (,,\)  varies with respect to the tax differentiation 
variable ("'(). 
Lemma 1  "\("'()  is  a decreasing junction. 
Proof:  In equilibritun, the product differentiation variable has to satisfy 
equations  (25)  and (26).  By properly dividing these two equations it  is 
obtained that ,,\  has to satisfy"\ =  (-12"\ + 8 +  16,,\2)/("'(,,\(4,,\  7)). Proper 
differentiationgives 8,,\/8"'( =  ,,\2(7-4"\)/(12-32"\-14"\"'(+12,,\2"'(). Evaluating 
thisderivativewithina neighborhoodoftheequilibrium ("'(= 1,"\ = 5.25123) 
is obtained 8,,\/8"'( =  -3.81053 < O. 
Q.E.D. 
The intuition behind this lemma is the following:  either increasing (de­
creasing)  the clean firm tax rate or decreasing (increasing)  the dirty firm 
tax rate, the equilibrium product differentiation decreases (increases).  As 
a  result, price competition is  fostered (relaxed).  Since the reallocation of 
consumers strongly depends on how intensive is price competition, this oh­
servation is determinant when the effects of such policies on total pollution 
in the market are under consideration. 
The change in optimal emission levels of both firma is given by: 
(27) 




8e2  = &28:A a,  =  0.00518792 > O  (29) 
87-I  8:A a, 87-I  k7"2 
Thereíore, after slightly raising (lowering)  .the dirty fum tax rate, both 
fums react increasing (decreasing) their optimal emission levels.  Total e:nns.. 
sions írom consumption are given by El =  elql and &  =  e2q2.  Then, we 
must evaluate the effects oí the tax on the reallocation oí consumers. It can 
be easily seen that, ií 7"1  is increased (decreased) both fums market shares 
decrease (increase), that is: 
8q¡  = 8q1 8:A a,  = -0.00952165 < O  (30)
87-1  8:A a, 87-1  7" 
8<b.  =  8(}J.  8:A a,  =  -0.0190433 < O  (31)
87-1  8:A  8,., 87-1  7" 
The íollowing proposition gives the final effects on the firms' total e:nns.. 
sions levels.  The rest oí prooí is given in the appendix. 
Proposition 5  Consider the environmentally differentiated duopoly described 
above  in which  both  firms  face  symmetric ad-valorem  taxation policy.  By 
slightly  increasing  (decreasing)  the  nonuniform ad-valorem tax rote  to  the 
dirty firm: 
a) total pollution from the dirty firm increases (decreases)  if and only if 
k7" < 1.040476  (k7" > 1.040476). 
b)  total pollution from the clean firm increases (decreases) if  and only if 
k7" < 0.396333  (k7" > 0.396333). 
e)  total pollution in the market increases  (decreases)  if  k7"  < 0.611047 
(k7" > 0.611047). 
Obviously,  the dirty firm reacts to the tax rate increase  (decrease)  by 
raising (lowering)  its unitary emissions level.  The clean firm best response 
consists oí raising (decreasing) its emissions level as well.  More importantly, 
by slightly raising (lowering) the dirty fum tax rate, the clean fum is given a 
technological advantage (disadvantage). Thus, the clean firm's emission level 
increases less (decreases more)  than the dirty fum one.  As a result, prod­
uct differentiation increases (decreases)  and then price competition lessens 
(íosters), inducing both firms' sales reductions (increasing). Thereíore, when 
total pollution in the market is under analysis, one has to be careful with this 
kind oí  policy because, as explained aboye, there are two opposite effects: the 
regulatory effect, which is related to the readjustment oí abatement efforts, 
and the market effect, which is related to the reallocation oí consumera be­
tween fums. Note that the market effect is larger the larger is the change in 
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product differentiation, which increases with the parameter k. Thus, when­
ever k  is large enough, the market effect exceeds the regulatory effect,  and 
the increase  (decrease) of the dirty firm tax rate results in lower  (higher) 
pollution levels.  Hence, this policy would be adequate for those situations in 
which the abatement costs are high. 
Next, we investigate the effects of slight changes of the clean firm's tax 
rate.  For instance, an increase of the clean firm's tax rate can be justified 
since it might be, as shown in Proposition (2.1), the more polluting firm in 
the market. Analogously to the previous case, both firms' optimal emissions 
levels change as follows: 
del = 001 8:A  Eh  = 0.0122465 > O  (32)
d'T2  8:A  8,8'T2  k'T2 
de2  = 8e2 8:A  Eh  + 002  = 0.248123 > O  (33)
d'T2  8:A 8,8'T2  8'T2  k'T2 
On the other hand, quantities vary according to: 
8rJi  =  8q1 8:A  Eh  = 0.00952165 > O  (34)
8'T2  8:A Eh 8'T2  'T 
8q;  = 8q<J 8:A 8, = 0.0190433 > O  (35)
&2  8:A Eh &2  'T 
Prom these two latter facts, the following proposition directly follows: 
Proposition 6  Consider the environmentally differentiated duopoly described 
above  in uhich both  firms  face  symmetric ad-valorem  taxation policy.  By 
slightly increasing  (decreasing)  the  nonuniform ad-valorem  tax rote  to the 
cleanfirm: 
a) total pollution from the dirty firm unambiguously increases (decreases) 
b) total pollution from the clean firm unambiguously increases (decreases) 
e) total pollution in the market unambiguously increases (decreases). 
The intuition behind this proposition is similar to the previous case.  By 
slightly raising (lowering) the clean firm tax rate, the dirty firm is given a 
technological advantage (disadvantage). In  this case, the clean firm increases 
(decreases) its unitary emissions level while the dirty firm's best response is 
to increase (decrease)  its emissions as well,  but less (more) than the clean 
firm one.  This results in first,  a lower  (higher) level of product differentiar­
tion, which increases (decreases) price competition, and second, an increase 
(decrease) of both firm's sales. Prom both reasons, the level of total emissions 
of each firm unambiguously increases (decreases).  Therefore, ir  the regulator 
18 6 
aims to reduce total pollution in the market, he should not increase the tax 
rate of the clean firmo 
Finally, note that even though it might seem very intuitive that policies 
consisting of an increase in the dirty firm's tax rate and a decrease in the 
clean firm's tax rate would yield the same results, it is not the case,  as we 
have seen above.  The reason is that there are two kinds of effects to be 
considered:  strategic and direct effects.  While an increase in the dirty fum 
tax rate gives a direct teclmological disadvantage to this firm, a decrease in 
the clean fum's tax rate only gives a strategic teclmological disadvantage to 
it. These effects drive our results. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the impact of altemative environmental pol­
icy instrwnents on a vertically differentiated market.  We show that partial 
intemalization of environmental damage by the conswners causes fums to 
supply two different varieties of the product, a  cleaner and a  dirtier one. 
In the unregulated equilibriwn the cleaner firm sells at a higher price and 
covera a higher portion of the market.  The negative extemality associated 
to the commodity is a function of a pollution index per unit of output and 
market sales of each variety.  Interestingly, even though the cleaner fum's 
em.issions per unit of output are lower than the dirtier one, total pollution 
derived by the former will be probably higher.  This is so since, the lower 
the level of abatement attained by the fums (the higher abatement costs) the 
more important becomes market shares in total pollution levels.  Hence, what 
might apparently be the cleaner variety can easily generate higher environ­
mental damages.  This result suggests that market coverage and consumera' 
reallocation between fuma play a crucial role in pollution control measures 
when there is vertical product differentiation. 
Indeed,  we  demonstrate that an envÍronmental standard may increase 
the level of pollution in the market, instead of decreasing it.  The standard 
induces both fums to improve their abatement teclmology, reducing product 
differentiation and fostering price competition.  Even though em.issions per 
unit of output are red.uced, lower prices increase market shares of both fuma. 
As more c::onswners are active in the market and both fums end up increasing 
sales, the standard may have a dramatic impact in total pollution levels.  The 
higher the cost of the abatement teclmology, the stronger is the net impact 
of the market effect (higher pollution levels associated to higher consumption 
levels as products become greener) over the regulatory effect (lower pollution 
levels induced. by regulation). Therefore, instruments such as direct subsidies 
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- that reduce the cost of the abatement technology - are unambiguously more 
effective in lowering aggregate pollution levels. 
It seems that as firms develop greener varieties, induced by current eco­
labeling and other types' of regulation, consumption levels of still polluting 
goods can easily increase. Even though recycled paper, biodegradable prod­
uets, batteries with lower cadmium content or unleaded fuels, to name just 
. a few  ex:amples, may appear as lesa polluting products to consumers, real­
location of consumers in the market may result in higher pollution levels.18 
Hence,  failure to acknowledge the role of consumers preferences for  green 
varieties can lead to higher environmental damages. 
Finally, it is shown that uniform commodity taxation increases, unam­
biguously, the level of pollution in a vertically differentiated market. This is 
so since, any increase in firms' costs induces lower abatement efforts of both 
firms and it does not affect vertical product differentiation. As a result, con­
sumption levels remain unchanged while per unit emissions increases.  How­
ever, if the ad-valorem tax rate is set in favor of the environmentally-friendly 
produet it will induce lower pollution levels in the market and, therefore, this 
policy would potentially be welfare improving.  Decreasing the tax rate to 
the cleaner firm,  eventually, seems to be more effective in terma of pollution 
abatement than increasing the tax rate to the dirtier one. 
lSMoreover, green markets might shllt environmental impacts, reducing sorne type of 
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7  Appendix 
7.1  Unregulated equilibrium 
Next, we characterÍze the equilibrium values in terms oíthe product differen­
tiation variable. The unregulated equilibrium is given by the unique solution 
to the íollowing two equations system: 
e  =1-,,\2  4"\-7 
1  k(4"\-1)3  (36) 
e  =  1 _ 4,,\ 4,,\
2 
- 3,,\ +2 
2  k (4--\ _ 1)3  (37) 
Equilibrium prices are given by: 
_ 
PI -
2,,\ (,,\ -1) (1 -
(4"\ _ 1) 
el)  d  _ 
an  P2  -
(,,\ -1)(1 ­ ed 
(4"\ ­ 1)  (38) 
Equilibrium market shares are given by: 
(39) 
Now we prove that firms do not increase profits by leapírogging the rival's 
choice.  Given the optimal choice oí firm 2, the firm 1 maximizes: 
(40) 
subject to el < e;.  From the first order condition it is obtained that el = 
1  1.757448/k. By substituting el into the profits function it yields profits 
TI  =  -2.75335/k which are clearly negative.  Analogously,  the clean firm 
maximizes II(ej , e2)  sub  ject to e2  > ej. It is easily obtained that e2  '  1, 
which yields zero profits. 
7.2  Maximum emission standards 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1.: 
a)  Dirty firm's total emÍssions  are El  =  qlel. Taking derivatives with 
respect to the maximum emission standard we  obtain that the change in 
the dirty firm's pollution level can be divided into two effects:  the "market 
23 
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effect" (ME) and the "regulation effect" (RE). In  fact, l:.!x =  M E +RE  = 
{!§l. --ª?L =  'l!1J.. --ª?Le1 +  q1 ~--ª?L , where M E denotes the market effect 
8>'  8emax  8>.  8emax  8e.w.x 8e.w.x 
and RE denotes the regulation effect. Note that M E measures the increase 
ofthe pollution level due to the demand shift caused by setting the maximum 
standard policy and RE measures the decrease of the pollution level caused 
by the maximum standard policy.  We are interested in determining the 
sign of these two effects, that is:  Sg(8r:::ax) = Sg(WJ: a!:x:e1 +  q1 ~a!:.x) = 
Sg(EM + ER). It is easily seen that Sg(EM)  =  Sg(rJt  x el)  < O as 
rJt < Oand 8:: > o. On the other hand, Sg(ER) =  Sg(q1)  > O.  Therefore, 
x 
the sign of ~x  is indeterminate. If EM > ER, it will have positive sign 
while if EM < ER it will have negative signo  As we show next, this depends 
on the level of abatement costs. 
2 Substituting a:ppropiately it can be easily seen that .Jl§L =  _ <4>.-1)2(k-4.8238x10- ) + 
,  8emax  64>.2-64>.+84 
4>.:1 which evaluatedat theunregulatedequilibriumgives 8r:::ax  =  -.26455k+ 
.27526. Therefore, dirty firm's emission level increases after the policy when­
ever k > 1.040483. 
b) On the other hand, the clean firm's total emissions are E2=  Q2e2.  The 
M E is given by M E =  ~8:: e2 which is unambiguously negative. The RE 
x 
is given by RE  =  qz ~a!:x which is unambiguously positive. As in the dirty 
fum case, the total effect will depend onwhich ofthese two effects is stronger. 
It can be easily seen that Jl.§L = _1  (4).-1~2(k-.25331) + 2>'(10)'+1)(4>.-1)  which 
8e.w.x  2  16>.  -16>.+21  16>.2_16>.+21 
evaluated at the unregulatedequilibriumgives ::::'x  =  -.5291k+29.863. This 
expression is greater than zero as long as k > 56.441126.  Thus, total pollu­
tion from consumption of the clean product decrease after setting the maxi­
mum eInÍssion standard whenever the abatement costs satisfy k < 56.441126. 
Otherwise, total pollution derived from consumption of the cleaner product 
increases. 
c )To find out the range of k  by which total pollution derived from con­
2 sumption ofboth products increasewe compute ~ =  8(SI+S2) =  _  (4).-1  )2(~-4.8238X10- ) + 
8e.w.x  8e.w.x  64>.  -64>.+84 
_>.__  1 (4).-1~2(k-.25331) + 2>'(10).+1)(4>'-1) 
4>.-1  2  16>'  -16>'+21  16>.2_16>.+21 
Again, evaluated at the unregulated equilibrium gives ~x  =  -.79365k+ 
30.138. This expression is greater than zero as long as k> 37.973917. 
Q.E.D. 
7.3  Nonuniform ad-valorem tax 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.9.: 
a) Firm 1 total emissions are El =  elQ1.  Proper differentiation gives e¡;:  = 
Ql~+  e1~' Substituting their corresponding values (in a neighborhood of 
24 the unregulated equilibrium)  and rearra:nging terms it is obtamed ~: = 
9.907~~gi:~~165k'T" which is a positive express  ion as long as kT < 1.040476. 
b) Firm 2 total emissions are E2 = e2Q2. Proper differentiation gives ~~ = 
Q2~+  e2~. Substitutmg their corresponding values (in a neighborhood of 
the unregulated equilibrium)  and rearrangmg terms it is  obtamed  ~~~  = 
7.5475-19.04.33kT  which is positive whenever kT < O39634 lOOOk'T"2  •  • 
c)  To find out the range of kTl for which total pollution m the market 
mcrease we analoa'ously compute 8ST = !!§J.. + fljjz =  17.4545-28.5649k'T"  > Ofor 
o  87"1  87"1  87"1  lOOOk'T"2 
all kT < 0.611047. 
Q.E.D. 
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figure 0.2: 